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What Works Is Work: Welfare Reform and 
Poverty Reduction 
Ron Haskins∗ 
¶1 This is an essay about how the 1996 welfare reform law and other policies 
contributed to the sharpest decline in child poverty since the early 1970s.  The story is 
told in the context of the nation’s long struggle to reduce poverty and the factors that 
have made it so difficult to make progress against poverty.  These factors involve both 
forces over which individuals have little or no control and factors over which they have 
almost complete control.  To a large extent, the achievement of welfare reform was to use 
both positive and negative incentives—carrots and sticks.  The sticks encourage, cajole, 
or force able-bodied mothers to exploit the factors over which they have control and enter 
the labor force.  The carrots reinforce their initiative with government-provided benefits 
that support poor and low-income workers.  I argue that this combination of carrots and 
sticks is the most successful strategy for reducing child poverty that the government has 
yet devised.  The strategy enjoys solid support from taxpayers, which suggests that 
innovative expansions that further increase personal responsibility, increase income, and 
reduce poverty would receive public support.  Unfortunately, there are clear downsides to 
the new policies, raising the issue of whether creating outcomes that include increased 
work, increased income, and reduced poverty for many offset the decline into deep 
poverty of a few. 
                                                 
∗ Senior Fellow in the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 202-797-6057, 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 2, "Poverty Status 
of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959-2005."  
 
¶2 Consider the surprising lack of progress against poverty in the last half-century or 
so.1  Figure 1 shows that poverty fell precipitously during the 1960s, rose slightly for a 
few years, and then fell to its lowest level ever, a little over eleven percent, in 1973 and 
1974.  Over the next three decades and more, poverty moved up and down in rough 
correlation with the economy, but never again approached the low achieved in the mid-
1970s. 
                                                 
1 The official poverty measure in the United States suffers from numerous flaws.  It is based on the cost of 
food in the 1950s and is adjusted only for family size and inflation.  Flaws include the failure to consider 
regional differences or rural/urban differences in the cost of living, the failure to include many types of 
income from government benefits, and the failure to consider work-related costs such as child care and 
transportation.  The National Academies, based on the work of an expert task force, published a thorough 
review of these and other problems and issued specific recommendations for revising the poverty measure.  
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 25–69 (Robert T. Michael 
& Constance F. Citro eds., 1995).  Although there has been abundant discussion in Washington, D.C. of 
changing the official poverty measure, so far it has not been changed.  The level of poverty in any given 
year may be misleading because the official definition is flawed, but poverty trends (like those discussed 
here) are more or less unaffected because a common definition has been followed over the years.  For the 
official definition of poverty and several other possible definitions, see generally id.  See also Rebecca 
Blank, Presidential Address: How to Improve Poverty Measurement in the United States, 27 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 233, 233–54 (2008); U.S. Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/povdef.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 









































































Source: Congressional Research Service, Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with 
Limited Income, RL33340, March 27, 2006.  
 
¶3 This lack of progress is especially surprising in view of the tsunami of government 
means-tested programs and the blizzard of spending on these programs (Figure 2).  As 
the breadth of these programs expanded—eventually to include cash, medical, nutrition, 
housing, social services, and other categories of programs—and spending grew as 
measured in constant dollars, as a percentage of all federal spending, and as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the nation made no progress against poverty.2  If 
anything, there was a slight increase in poverty between the early 1970s and 2006.  Why? 
                                                 
2 Since 1968, federal spending on means-tested programs has increased from 6% to nearly 19% of total 
federal outlays and from less than 1.2% to nearly 3.6% of GDP.  Author’s calculations based on VEE 
BURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CASH AND NONCASH BENEFITS FOR PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOME: 
ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA, FY2002-FY2004 (2006). 
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A. Changing Family Composition 
Figure 3 





















Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, at 
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ch1.xls.  
 
¶4 It is by now old news that the American family has undergone profound changes in 
recent decades.  Marriage rates fell while divorce rates increased to a high level in the 
early 1980s and have remained high since.3  Non-marital birth rates continue to grow 
beyond all previous experience as cohabitation continues to increase.4  The upshot is that 
at any given moment nearly thirty percent of American children live in a single-parent 
family, and over the course of their childhood far more spend some time in a single-
parent family (Figure 3).5  These discouraging figures are even worse in the case of 
minorities, especially black Americans.  About seventy percent of black children are born 
into a single-parent family6 and around half of the rest experience a divorce.7  Thus, 
approximately eighty percent of black children spend at least part of their childhood 
living outside the context of a married-couple family.8 
                                                 
3 See David Elwood & Christopher Jenks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States Since 
1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 25, 30 (Daniel P. Moynihan, Timothy M. Smeeding & Lee 
Rainwater eds., 2006). 
4 Id. at 33–35. 
5 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present, in 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY TABLE CH-1 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ch1.xls. 
6 NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA 
FOR 2004, 61 tbl. 20, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_01.pdf. 
7 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Survey of Income and Program Participation, Table 3: Marital History for 
People 15 Years and Over, by Age and Sex, for Black Alone: 2004, available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/marital-hist/2004/tab3-blackalone.xls. 
8 If around seventy percent of black children are born outside marriage and about half of the remainder 





























Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 4, “Poverty Status of 
Families, by Type of Family, Presence of Related Children, Race, and Hispanic Origin," 
at www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov4.html.   
 
¶5 Figure 4 shows one reason why scholars and policymakers should be concerned 
about the growing number of children in single-parent families.  In most years, poverty 
rates are four or five times as high in female-headed families as in married-couple 
families.  It follows that as the fraction of children living in female-headed families rises 
(see Figure 3), all else being equal, so does the poverty rate for children.  Given the 
disparity in poverty rates between these family types, it is little wonder that research 
suggests that an increase of children in married-coupled families would produce a fall in 
the poverty rate.9  In addition, there could well be a long-term impact on poverty because 
children reared by their married parents do better in school, are less likely to have mental 
health problems, are less likely to be arrested, and are more likely to go to college than 
children reared by single parents.10  In any case, until the rate of children living with their 
married parents increases, the high and still increasing share of children living with single 
parents will continue to push the poverty rate upwards. 
                                                                                                                                                 
experience a divorce, it would at first seem to follow that about eighty-five percent of black children spend 
some time in a single-parent family.  However, around half of the children born outside marriage are born 
to couples that cohabit and some of these couples stay together and eventually marry.  
9 See Robert I. Lerman, The Impact of the Changing US Family Structure on Child Poverty and Income 
Inequality, 63 ECONOMICA S119, S127–37 (1996); Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Richer or for 
Poorer: Marriage as an Antipoverty Strategy, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 594–97 (2002). 
10 See generally Sara McLanahan, Elisabeth Donahue & Ron Haskins, Introducing the Issue, FUTURE OF 
CHILD., Fall 2005, at 3, 10, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/01_foc_15-
2_fall05_intro.pdf (arguing that marriage is “the most effective family structure in which to raise 
children”). 
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B. Changes in Work and Wages 
Figure 5
Employment-to-Population Ratios for 16-24 Year-Old 




















16-24 year-old Black Males
16-24 year-old Black Females
Source: Calculations by Gary Burtless and Emily Roessel of the 
Brookings Institution using data from the Current Population Survey.  
 
¶6 Work rates for males have declined in recent years in several nations with advanced 
economies.11  This decline has been especially acute in the United States among young 
black males.  Figure 5 shows labor force participation rates for young black males, black 
females, and never-married mothers of all races (but disproportionately black).  Black 
male work rates started at the remarkably low level of slightly over fifty percent in the 
mid-1960s, declined precipitously in the early and mid-1970s, held steady until the early 
2000s, and then fell again, ending the period with a work rate that had declined by nearly 
one-third since the mid-1960s. 
¶7 There may well be a connection between the precipitous fall in male work rates, 
especially for young minority males, and the falling rate of marriage for young blacks.  
There is considerable evidence that a major qualification that females look for in a mate 
is employment and earnings.  Poor women may be willing to cohabit with their 
boyfriends and even to have babies with them without any intention of marrying them 
because, among other factors, they are unemployed or work only sporadically.12  
Nonworking males contribute to child poverty by having babies outside marriage, by not 
                                                 
11 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK: BOOSTING JOBS AND INCOMES 267 
(2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/15/36900060.pdf. 
12 Based on interviews with 162 inner-city black, white, and Puerto Rican mothers, Edin and Kefalas 
emphasize the importance of economic factors in the mothers’ thinking about males they would agree to 
marry.  KATHY EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD 
BEFORE MARRIAGE 71–80, 201–04 (2005). 
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forming married-parent families, and by failing to provide support for their children when 
they live apart. 
 
Figure 6 




















Source: Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, Sylvia Allegretto, The State of Working America 
2006-2007 (Economic Policy Institute 2007).  
 
¶8 Nonwork is certainly an important reason for the lack of progress against poverty, 
but another part of the story involves problems with the low-wage labor market.  Despite 
increases in the share of males and females of all ethnic groups completing high school 
since the 1960s, lack of education and skills at the bottom of the income distribution is 
still an important problem.  Jobs that pay good wages usually require skills and 
experience, often based in part on education and training.  But many young people—
again especially black males—drop out of high school.  Many more of all ethnic groups 
go no further than high school.13  Furthermore, international trade, growing sophistication 
of business technologies, immigration of low-skilled workers, and the availability of 
cheap labor abroad have conspired to make wages more or less stagnant at the bottom of 
the U.S. wage distribution. 
¶9 Figure 6 shows the trends in wages at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninety-fifth percentiles 
of the wage distribution from 1979 to 2005.  To more clearly depict these trends, wages 
are expressed in proportion to wages in 1979.  The story portrayed in Figure 6 is quickly 
told: wages at the bottom, after falling and then rising, are only a little above where they 
were nearly three decades ago; wages in the middle have increased somewhat (around 
0.3% per year); and wages at the top have increased by nearly 40%.  During this period, 
the American economy was the envy of the world because it generated so many jobs, 
                                                 
13 For an excellent overview of trends in both high school and college graduation rates, see generally 
CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MICHAEL HOUT, CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW AMERICA CHANGED IN THE LAST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS (2006). 
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grew by nearly three percent per year on average, and greatly increased the average 
wealth of most Americans.14  Yet wages at the bottom have hardly improved.  The only 
time the bottom of the wage distribution rose was during the tight labor market of the 
second half of the 1990s.  But in most years for the past quarter century, wages at the 
bottom fell or were stagnant.  If the American economy provided steady increases in 
wages at the bottom, workers receiving those wages would have a better chance to rise 
above poverty.  But unfortunately, the job market at the bottom turns out to be another 
force pushing poverty up. 
C. Stagnant Levels of Education 
Figure 7
Median Family Income for Heads of Household with 









































































Professional or graduate degree
4 year college degree
High school degree but not a 4 year college degree
Less than high school (dropout)
Source: Julia Isaacs, Isabel Sawhill, and Ron Haskins, Getting Ahead or Losing Ground: 
Economic Mobility in America (Pew Charitable Trusts 2008).  
 
¶10 The American economy rewards those with more education, and the rewards have 
been growing in recent decades.  Figure 7 portrays the differences in returns on schooling 
for those who have achieved various levels of educational credentials.  Three points are 
apparent.  First, there has consistently been a major difference in the income between 
those with higher and lower educational credentials.  Second, this difference has been 
increasing for more than three decades.  By 2005, there were major and increasing 
differences in income between those with professional or graduate degrees and those who 
                                                 
14 See Ron Haskins, Wealth and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC 
MOBILITY IN AMERICA 47, 48 (Julia B. Isaacs, Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, eds, 2008), available at 
http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/Economic_Mobility_in_America_Full.pdf; see also ROBERT 
I. LERMAN, THE URBAN INST., HAVE MIDDLE INCOME PARENTS IMPROVED THEIR ECONOMIC STATUS? 
(2007), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/311424.html (finding that all middle-income 
parents saw an increase in income, but only married parents had an increase in net worth). 
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held bachelors degrees.  Those with bachelors degrees did much better than those with 
high school degrees, and those with high school degrees did better than dropouts.  Third, 
the returns on achieving either a BA or a professional or graduate degree have been 
increasing for thirty years, while the returns on a high school degree or no degree have 
been declining or flat.  In large part because of the wage story, high school dropouts now, 
and in the future, will have trouble rising above poverty, as will many with only high 
school diplomas. 
¶11 Although people of both genders and all ethnic groups dramatically increased their 
levels of educational attainment over the course of the twentieth century, the rate of 
increase of high school completion has slowed considerably.15  Equally important, 
children’s learning of basic skills has been virtually flat over the past quarter century in 
both reading and math.16  Further, at least forty percent of Americans receive no 
education beyond high school, and the rate of college completion is strikingly lower 
among minorities and children from low-income families.17  Education levels and 
educational achievement, especially for those in the bottom half of the distribution, are 
stagnant, thereby contributing to the difficulty of reducing poverty. 
D. Immigration 
¶12 Another factor that puts upward pressure on U.S. poverty rates is immigration.  
Each year around 1.5 million immigrants enter the United States, about one-third of them 
illegally.18  Recent immigrants to the United States fall into a bi-modal distribution.  
Many are highly educated and tend to do well in the U.S. labor market by getting good 
jobs with high wages.  By contrast, many immigrants are high school dropouts and have 
only their labor to contribute to the American economy.19  The poverty rate among 
immigrants is 15.2%, nearly 30% above that of non-immigrants.20  If the immigrant 
poverty rate is higher than the rate for non-immigrants, it is a mathematical certainty that 
immigrants increase the overall poverty rate.  A reasonable estimate is that in 2005, 
immigrants increased the poverty rate by about one percentage point.21  Further, 
immigrant children make up about twenty-two percent of U.S. children, because many 
                                                 
15 CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MICHAEL HOUT, CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW AMERICA CHANGED IN THE 
LAST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 12–18 (2006). 
16 See National Center for Educational Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Tables and Figures, 
http://nces.ed.gov/quicktables/index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
17 Id. 
18 For an overview of the trends in immigration to the United States between 1960 and 2005, see Philip 
Martin & Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America, POPULATION BULLETIN, Dec. 
2006, at 1, 5, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf06/61.4USMigration.pdf.  For information about illegal 
immigration, see JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT 
POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2006). 
19 Ron Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 81, 82 (Julia B. Isaacs, Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/EMP_Immigrants_ChapterVII.pdf [hereinafter 
Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility]. 
20 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, People in Poverty by Nativity: 1993 to 2006, in CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: TABLE 23 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov23.xls. 
21 Author’s calculations based on id.  
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immigrants are in their prime child-bearing years.22  Thus, the impact of immigrants on 
the child poverty rate is somewhat greater than their impact on the overall poverty rate. 
 
Figure 8
Percentage Wage Difference of First and Second 
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Source: George Borjas, Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant 
Population , Future of Children, Fall 2006, at 59.  
 
¶13 A major reason for excess poverty among immigrants is that they command low 
wages relative to American workers (Figure 8).  Comparing the age-adjusted wages of 
first-generation immigrants with the wages of non-immigrants in 1940, 1970, and 2000, 
George Borjas of Harvard showed a substantial decline of immigrant wages, from 5.8% 
above average non-immigrant wages in 1940, falling to only 1.4% above in 1970, and 
then falling still further to 19.7% below the average wages of native-born citizens in 
2000.23  The reason for this decline in relative wages of immigrants is that rapidly 
increasing shares of immigrants come from poor countries, such as Mexico, and have 
relatively low levels of education.24  Nor is the problem of low relative wages confined to 
the first generation.  If immigrants from a given region, such as Latin America, have 
                                                 
22 RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX, JASON OST, JANE REARDON-ANDERSON & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN 
INST., THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS 5 (2004). 
23 George J. Borjas, Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population, FUTURE OF 
CHILD., Fall 2006, at 55, 59, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/04_5563_borjas.pdf; see 
also Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility, supra note 19, at 81 (reviewing the labor 
market experiences of immigrants over the last several decades and showing that the average education and 
wages of each new generation have been falling and that these relatively low wages persist into the second 
generation). 
24 See generally Mark R. Rosenzweig, Global Wage Differences and International Student Flows, in 
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 57 (Susan M. Collins & Carol Graham, eds., 2006) (examining educational 
levels of foreign-born students in the United States). 
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relative wages below average, their children will have higher relative wages because they 
will move closer to the mean of non-immigrant wages.  Even so, as can be seen by in 
Figure 8, second generation immigrant relative wages fell from 14.6% above the non-
immigrant average in 1970 to only 6.3% above average in 2000.  If this pattern of 
declining relative wages continues into the future, the 2000 cohort of children immigrants 
will have wages that are below those of non-immigrant workers when they reach their 
prime earning years in the 2030s.  Declining relative wages in both the first and second 
generation promise to continue the current trend of immigrants putting upward pressure 
on the U.S. poverty rate. 
E. Summary 
¶14 The deck is stacked against scholars, administrators, and policymakers who want to 
figure out ways to reduce poverty in America—not to mention families that want to 
escape from or avoid poverty.  An increasing share of children live in the family type that 
has the highest poverty rate, males have trended toward non-work, wages at the bottom of 
the distribution have been stagnant, too many young people drop out of school and fail to 
achieve strong math and literacy skills, and millions of low-skilled immigrants have 
placed downward pressure on wages at the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in 
some regions of the country.  But nevermind the stacked deck.  Policymakers, with help 
from scholars, have figured out a strategy for increasing income and reducing poverty 
among the most poverty-ridden group in our society—single females with children. 
II. A SUCCESSFUL PLAN TO REDUCE POVERTY 
A. Background of the 1996 Reforms 
¶15 A key part of this anti-poverty strategy is the 1996 welfare reform law and, in 
particular, its work requirements.  The context of the 1996 law was the failure of the 
strategy of simply giving money and in-kind benefits to the poor to reduce poverty.  
President Johnson, who declared the War on Poverty in 1964, said that his strategy was to 
provide “a hand up, not a hand out.”25  Even so, research by David Ellwood and Mary Jo 
Bane at Harvard in the mid-1980s showed that the strategy of unencumbered giving led 
to many very long stays on the nation’s major cash welfare program, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC).  Of the families on the rolls at any given moment, sixty-
five percent would eventually be on cash welfare for eight years or more (counting repeat 
spells).26 
¶16 As Congress began to wake up to the problem of welfare dependency, at least five 
streams merged to create a mighty river for reform.27  The first was that the public did not 
like the federal strategy of supporting people on welfare for extended periods.  The public 
wanted able-bodied people on welfare to work and leave welfare.28  Although usually 
dormant as a political force, this preference of the public for work over welfare could be 
                                                 
25 MICHAEL L. GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY, at xiv–xv (1996). 
26 Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping into and out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 1, 12, 18, 21 (1986). 
27 This account of the 1996 welfare reform legislation is based on RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM LAW (2006) [hereinafter HASKINS, WORK OVER 
WELFARE]. 
28 R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 169–95 (2000). 
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ignited by any major public figure who decided to make welfare an issue, as Republicans 
often did approximately at election time.  Second, the welfare reform legislation that was 
enacted with much fanfare in 1988, which mostly broadened benefits and included 
something like work suggestions rather than work requirements, was followed by a rapid 
increase in the welfare rolls.29  Third, governors began experimenting with programs to 
encourage and cajole welfare recipients into work, primarily by teaching them how to 
look for work and then helping them plan for and participate in job interviews, a strategy 
widely referred to as “job search.”  In large and well-conducted demonstration programs 
that included random-assignment evaluation designs, many of these programs were 
shown to increase work, reduce welfare spending, and, in some cases, save government 
money.30  The upshot was that many governors jumped on the welfare reform bandwagon 
and began to agitate in Washington for more flexibility in running their welfare 
programs.  A fourth important factor was that Bill Clinton won the Democratic 
nomination for President in part by campaigning on “ending welfare as we know it.”  
Such a political slogan had never previously been heard from a Democrat.  Once elected, 
Clinton appointed a task force to write his welfare reform bill.  After about a year of 
deliberation, Clinton’s task force produced a bill, but then the President encountered 
resistance from Democrats in Congress who were not willing to support the strong work 
requirements Clinton wanted.  So Clinton and the Democratic Congress agreed to delay 
action until after the congressional elections of 1994.31 
¶17 Bad mistake.  For just when the Clinton effort to reform welfare appeared to be on 
life support, Republicans won both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections, 
considerably reducing Clinton’s ability to control congressional action on welfare reform.  
Now the fifth factor that produced the 1996 reforms was in place.  House Republicans 
had been intent on reforming welfare for several years and had run their congressional 
elections on a platform that included a radical welfare reform proposal, developed by a 
small group of House Republicans appointed by the Republican leadership, that went 
beyond anything even Clinton had contemplated.32  In retrospect, it seems fair to 
conclude that Clinton started a welfare reform movement that eventually exploded out of 
his control.  In any case, Republicans passed their bill twice in 1995.  Clinton vetoed both 
because they were too radical.33  But Republicans passed a somewhat modified bill in 
1996 and, with the presidential election approaching, half the Democrats in the House 
and Senate supported the Republican bill and Clinton signed it into law.34 
                                                 
29 HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 11–19. 
30 See generally JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1991) (synthesizing 
welfare reform experiments that took place in the states in the 1970s and 1980s before Congress enacted 
the sweeping Welfare Reform Law of 1996 and showing, based on rigorous evaluations of programs in 
twenty-one states involving over 65,000 people, that the reform programs increased the earnings of poor 
families and saved money). 
31 HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 81. 
32 For details on the development of this bill, see id. at 20–83. 
33 Although opinions might differ, the bill President Clinton signed in August of 1996 was not very 
different from the two bills he vetoed.  All of the main features of the original bills were in the signed bill, 
including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, the child care block grant, the 
mandatory work requirements, the five-year time limit, the restrictions on welfare benefits for noncitizens, 
the reductions in food stamp benefits, and many others.  Perhaps the major change in the bill President 
Clinton signed was that the reduction in the Earned Income Tax Credit was changed and only provisions 
approved by the Clinton Administration were included in the signed bill.  See id. at 314–31, 364–76. 
34 Id. at 314–31. 
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B. Provisions of the 1996 Law 
¶18 The 1996 welfare reform law was the most sweeping social legislation since the 
enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965.  The law deeply reformed child care, 
Supplemental Security Income for both children and for drug addicts, child support 
enforcement, and welfare for noncitizens.35  Any of these individual sets of reforms 
would have constituted major changes in the nation’s social programs, but taken together 
they made the 1996 law a blockbuster almost without precedent.  But the reform that 
commanded the most attention from scholars, reporters, and politicians was the repeal of 
AFDC—a major New Deal program—and its replacement by the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program. 
¶19 The heart of the TANF reforms can be captured in five major provisions.36  The 
first was the end of entitlement.  The AFDC program provided a guaranteed cash benefit 
to anyone who met the qualifications, roughly meaning anyone who had a child and no 
job.  This legal right to cash welfare was repealed, leaving the way open for states to 
make welfare benefits contingent on specific actions that could lead to employment.  
Equally important was the symbolic value of the end of entitlement.  Parents no longer 
had a right to welfare; they had to earn it, primarily by working or preparing for work. 
¶20 The second major feature of the new law was the creation of a cash welfare block 
grant.37  Under AFDC, states provided benefits to qualified individuals and the federal 
government paid half or more of the benefit.  Thus, federal payments to states were 
dependent on the size of the caseload—the higher the caseload, the more federal dollars 
were given to the state.  States that established programs to help welfare recipients work 
and then leave the rolls lost federal dollars; states that expanded their caseloads received 
more federal dollars.  By contrast, under the block grant, states received a flat sum of 
federal dollars (roughly equal to the amount they received in 1994 or 1995, whichever 
was greater) no matter how many people were on the rolls, thereby giving them incentive 
to develop programs to help recipients leave the rolls. 
¶21 The third major feature of the new law was that states had to enroll half (after a 
five-year phase-in) of their caseload in work programs, with the proviso that for every 
percentage point by which they reduced their caseload relative to the size of their 1994 
caseload, their fifty percent work requirement would be reduced by one percentage 
point.38  The purpose of the work requirement was not only to ensure that individual 
welfare recipients would have help finding work, but also to make sure that states 
substantially revised their welfare programs so that the programs featured strong 
components that helped and hassled most adults on the caseload to enter the workforce.  
The aim was to change what might be considered the “culture of welfare” from a 
                                                 
35 For details, see id. at 364–76; WEAVER, supra note 28, at 316–41. 
36 The statutory provisions of TANF are found in Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 601–608 (1997).  The five provisions discussed in this section are found within Part A of Title IV as 
follows: end of entitlement, § 601(b); block grant, § 603; work requirements, § 607; sanctions, § 607(e); 
time limit, § 608(a)(7).  These and the other provisions of the welfare reform legislation are outlined in 
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 364–76; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, 104TH CONG., SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS MADE BY PUBLIC LAW 104-193 (Comm. Print 
1996) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS]. 
37 42 U.S.C. § 603. 
38 For example, if a state reduced its caseload twenty percent below the 1995 level, the work requirement 
would be fifty percent minus twenty percent, or thirty percent.  See 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3). 
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program that primarily cut checks and ignored personal responsibility to a program that 
tried to help people get back on their feet and achieve self-sufficiency through work.39 
¶22 The fourth major tenet of the 1996 law required states to back up their work 
requirements with a state-devised system for imposing sanctions on recipients who did 
not meet the state work requirements.40  Under this provision, every state had to reduce 
recipient cash benefits if the recipient did not prepare for work, search for work, or 
actually work for a minimum number of hours.  Although states were not required to 
completely terminate welfare benefits for repeated violations of the work requirement, 
eventually all but nine states designed a sanctioning system that called for termination of 
benefits under some circumstances for some period of time. 
¶23 Finally, one of the most controversial provisions of the legislation encouraged, but 
did not require, states to terminate benefits after five years.41  This provision had two 
major loopholes.  The first was that, as drafted, the provision simply disallowed using 
federal dollars for families that had been on the rolls for five years.  Thus, states could 
use their own money to pay for families the state wanted to stay on the rolls after five 
years.  In addition, the federal law allowed states to use federal dollars even after five 
years for up to twenty percent of their caseload.  Perhaps the most important function of 
the five-year time limit was to signal—as the name of the new program implies—that 
welfare is temporary.42 
¶24 Taken together, these five features of the new law constituted radical change in an 
important federal program that had been in force for over six decades.  Nonetheless, the 
legislation passed Congress on a huge bipartisan vote and was signed into law by a 
Democratic president. 
C. Work Support System 
¶25 But welfare reform was only half the federal strategy for attacking poverty.  Over 
the period of more than a decade before the enactment of the 1996 reforms, Congress and 
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton had passed a series of 
laws that created, modified, or expanded programs that provided cash and in-kind 
benefits to poor and low-income working families, mostly families with children.  
Collectively, these programs are often referred to as the nation’s “work support system.”  
In my view, the work support system is one of the most important ingredients in the 
nation’s approach to social policy.  The system is comprised of four essential programs 
and several less vital, but still important programs. 
                                                 
39 See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3 (1988) (emphasizing the 
check writing culture of welfare almost a decade before the welfare reform law of 1996); IRENE LURIE, AT 
THE FRONT LINES OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS 1 
(2006) (directly observing welfare offices and finding that helping clients find work was the major 
emphasis of the new welfare administration); RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAIS, IMPLEMENTING THE 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 1 (1999) (finding that major changes have taken 
place in the direction of emphasizing work, after reviewing the reforms in state programs about two years 
after the 1996 law went into effect).  
40 The Urban Institute maintains information about such sanctions.  See The Urban Inst., Assessing the New 
Federalism Project, http://anfdata.urban.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
41 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7). 
42 Richard P. Nathan, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n: Updating 
Theories of American Federalism (Sept. 2, 2006). 
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¶26 The most important program in the work support system is the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), which provides cash payments through the tax code to boost the income 
of low-income workers, especially those with children.  The EITC, created in 1975, was 
expanded in 1986 by Reagan, in 1990 by George H.W. Bush, and in 1993 by Clinton.43  
By the time the welfare reform law passed in 1996, the EITC was the biggest program 
providing cash to low-income families.  Workers with children could receive a wage 
supplement of up to $3600 (in 1996)—a little less than twice as much as a full time 
worker at the minimum wage would receive if the minimum wage had been raised by $1 
an hour (as in fact it was—from $4.25 to $5.15—in the year after welfare reform was 
enacted).44 
¶27 Similarly, in 1990, Congress passed and George H.W. Bush signed a law that 
created a block grant for child care.45  Simultaneously, two new programs were created 
under the AFDC program to help families pay for child care.  The welfare reform law of 
1996 combined all three child care programs and a few others into a child care block 
grant and approximately doubled the funding over a period of years so that states would 
have additional money to help families pay for child care.46 
¶28 The food stamp program already helped millions of poor working families and 
promised to provide an income supplement in the form of food credits to families that left 
welfare.  As in the past, food stamps declined in value as earnings increased, but a typical 
mother with two children earning $10,000 per year qualified for about $1500 in food 
stamps in 1996.47  For several years, states complained that it was administratively 
difficult to provide working families with food stamps primarily because the states were 
fined for making payment errors and the cases most likely to have errors were those of 
working families.48  Thus, states were not aggressive in providing food stamps to 
working families.  In the 2002 farm bill, Congress changed several rules in the food 
stamp program that made it easier to administer cases that involve working families.49  
Since then, the rate of participation in food stamp programs by working families has 
increased substantially.50 
¶29 Two programs—Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP)—work together to provide health insurance to virtually all children from 
                                                 
43 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 88, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 19, 26, 29, 30, 47 U.S.C.).  
44 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 19, 26, 42 U.S.C.). 
45 Child Care & Development Block Grant of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858–9858g (2008); STAFF OF H. COMM. 
ON WAYS & MEANS, 108th CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS 
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 9-1 to 9-62 (Comm. Print 2004) 
[hereinafter 2004 GREEN BOOK]. 
46 HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 367–68. 
47 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-16 to 15-18. 
48 AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASS’N, CROSSROADS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL POLICY 45 
(2001), available at http://www.aphsa.org/Publications/Doc/crossroads.pdf. 
49 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7, 16, & 21 U.S.C.). 
50 CAROLINA RATCLIFFE, SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN & KENNETH FINEGOLD, THE URBAN INST., THE EFFECT 
OF STATE FOOD STAMP AND TANF POLICIES ON FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 26 (2007), 
available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411438.html. 
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families earning under 200% of the federal poverty levels.51  Before the mid-1980s, 
mothers who left welfare for work usually lost their Medicaid coverage.52  Especially 
given the low rates of health insurance coverage provided by employers to low-wage 
workers, the loss of Medicaid was a major issue for mothers.  In fact, mothers could 
make a rational decision to stay on welfare in order to ensure that their children had 
health coverage.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, primarily under the leadership of Henry 
Waxman of the House Commerce Committee, Congress began the long process of 
breaking the connection between welfare and Medicaid.53  By 1996, all children in 
families under the poverty level and many children in families up to 185% of the poverty 
level were eligible for Medicaid regardless of the status of their mothers.54  Then in 1997, 
Congress enacted SCHIP and states were given funds to cover children in families up to 
200% of the poverty level.55  Mothers who leave welfare are covered for up to one year, 
but there are many poor working mothers who do not have health care coverage. 
¶30 The EITC, child care, food stamps, and health insurance programs are generally 
considered to be the major programs in the work support system.56  However, a host of 
other programs, although not designed specifically to help low-income workers, have 
eligibility standards, phase-out rates, or services that help low-income working families.  
All the child nutrition programs (child care food program, school lunch and breakfast, 
and the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children) as well 
as the housing programs are chief among these programs.57  In addition, all mothers who 
have custody of children with a living non-resident father are eligible for services from 
the Child Support Enforcement program.58  However defined, the work support programs 
are an indispensable tool for encouraging work by low-income adults and for helping 
low-income workers increase their income and avoid poverty. 
III. TRENDS IN WORK AND CHILD POVERTY IN THE WELFARE REFORM ERA 
A. Trends in Enrolment, Work, Earnings, and Child Poverty 
¶31 Most students of welfare reform and its effects emphasize that three factors, taken 
together, are reasonable explanations for the changes in welfare rolls: work rates, 
earnings, and child poverty that occurred among families headed by single mothers 
beginning in the mid-1990s.  These factors are the sticks of welfare reform, the carrots of 
the work support system—especially the expansion of the EITC, and the hot economy of 
the mid- and late-1990s.59 
                                                 
51 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-26 to 15-98.  
52 ELLWOOD, supra note 39, at 175–76. 
53 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-40. 
54 Id. at 15-33 to 15-35.  
55 Id. at 15-83 to 15-98. 
56 See generally ROBERT P. STOKER & LAURA A. WILSON, WHEN WORK IS NOT ENOUGH: STATE AND 
FEDERAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT NEEDY WORKERS (2006) (reviewing the development of the work support 
system and its current functioning and concluding that the system has great potential but that problems in 
implementation prevent it from helping as many low-income workers as it could). 
57 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-98 to 15-118. 
58 See generally id. at 8-1. 
59 HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 332–63.  See generally JEFFREY GROGGER & LYNN A. 
KAROLY, WELFARE REFORM: EFFECTS OF A DECADE OF CHANGE (2005) (studying the effects of Welfare 
Reform on recipient’s behavior); Christopher Bollinger et al., Welfare Reform and the Level and 
Composition of Income, in WELFARE REFORM AND ITS LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICA’S POOR 


































Source: Calculations by Gary Burtless of the Brookings Institution with data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  
 
¶32 Certainly nothing like the decline in welfare rolls seen after this reform had ever 
occurred before.  In fact, in the three decades between the early 1960s and the early 
1990s, the rolls increased almost every year, with two large spurts in the early 1970s and 
the early 1990s.60  But since 1994, the rolls have declined every year, falling a total of 
sixty percent over that period.61  This decline in the rolls was accompanied by a 
substantial increase in the share of single mothers who worked.  Figure 9 shows the share 
of married, single, and never-married mothers who were employed each year between 
1985 and 2005.  The work rates of both single mothers and the subgroup of single 
mothers who were never married increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s.  In 
fact, the work rates of never-married mothers increased about forty percent in the four 
years between 1996 and 2000. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(James P. Ziliak ed.) (forthcoming 2009) (documenting the changes in income of single mothers post-
welfare reform); Robert F. Schoeni & Rebecca M. Blank, What Has Welfare Reform Accomplished? 
Impacts on Welfare Participation, Employment, Income, Poverty, and Family Structure 4 (RAND, 
Working Paper No. DRU-2268, 2000), available at http://www.rand.org/labor/DRU/DRU2268.pdf 
(concluding that welfare reform both increased family earnings and reduced public assistance 
participation). 
60 2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 7-32. 
61 HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 334. 




Earnings and Welfare Income for the Bottom Two 












Note: The income boundaries for the bottom two income quintiles were $0 and about $25,300;  
Welfare income is cash, school lunch, food stamps, and housing.
Source: Calculations by Richard Bavier with data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
 
 
¶33 Given their rising work levels, it is not surprising that single mothers’ incomes 
increased during this period, nor that the share of income accounted for by earnings 
increased as well.  Figure 10 traces the major components of income for mothers in the 
bottom two income quintiles (with total income between $0 and about $25,300 in 2006).  
After the mid-1990s, income from earnings plus the EITC increased every year—until 
2001—while income from welfare declined.  Even after the recession of 2001, as the 
employment and earnings of female heads declined, earnings plus the EITC were still 
more than ninety percent higher in 2006 than they had been in 1993 before the rise in 
employment began. 




Poverty Rates for Black Children, Children in 



































































Children in Female-Headed Families
All Children
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Tables 2 and 3.  
 
¶34 Reducing welfare dependency, increasing employment of single mothers, and 
reducing child poverty were three of the goals of welfare reform.  If welfare dependency 
declined and employment and earnings increased among female heads following welfare 
reform, as we have seen that they did, trends in child poverty were likely to be affected.  
Figure 11 shows that between the mid-1990s and the recession of 2001, overall child 
poverty, poverty for children in female-headed families, and poverty among black 
children declined substantially.  The declines in poverty among children in female-
headed families (twenty-eight percent) and in black families (thirty-five percent) were 
especially steep.62  Indeed, both the rates for all children in female-headed families and 
for black children reached their lowest level ever, and poverty among all children was 
within one percentage point of its lowest level ever—a remarkable achievement given all 
the demographic forces working simultaneously to drive up child poverty rates. 
¶35 Two points about these declining poverty rates seem especially notable.  The first is 
that, as we have seen, if the nation is to make progress against child poverty, policies that 
focus on female-headed families should be a major component of a national strategy both 
because so many children live in female-headed families and because the poverty rate of 
this family form is so high.  That the poverty rate for children in female-headed families 
declined so substantially seems reasonable because single mothers were the main target 
of welfare reform and were also the group with the greatest increase in work rates and 
                                                 
62 The decline in poverty for both groups was calculated based on the peak rate in the early 1990s (1992 for 
both blacks and female-headed families) and the lowest rate in either 2000 or 2001 (2000 for female-
headed families and 2001 for blacks) before poverty started rising again following the recession of 2001. 
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earnings.  Second, the robust decline in poverty among black children is attributable in 
part to the fact that such a high proportion of black children (around fifty percent) live in 
female-headed families and that black women were no less likely to find work than white 
women.63  
B. Explaining the Trends 
Figure 12
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Source: Congressional Budget Office, Policy Changes Affecting 






¶36 Primarily because we do not have data from random-assignment experiments, it is 
inappropriate to conclude that welfare reform alone accounted for the trends reviewed 
above.  This is especially the case since so many other factors that could plausibly affect 
the welfare rolls and employment by mothers formerly on welfare were also changing.  
Figure 12, based on a report from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office,64 shows 
changes in the major programs that constitute the work support system.  The figure shows 
that if child care, SCHIP, the Child Tax Credit, Medicaid, and the EITC had not been 
                                                 
63 For data on the share of black children living with single mothers, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Household 
Relationship and Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, in 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT TABLE C-2 (2006), 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006/tabC2-blackalone.xls.  For data 
on work rates for low-income black, white, and Hispanic mothers, see U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2007) III-23, available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators07/ch3.pdf. 
64 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING MANDATORY SPENDING FOR LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES NOT RECEIVING CASH WELFARE (1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/8xx/doc849/noncash.pdf. 
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created or expanded after 1984, in 1999 the nation would have spent just $5.6 billion 
providing support through these programs to working families.  But because all these 
programs were originated or expanded between 1984 and 1999, $51.7 billion was spent 
on working families.  Politicians and the media often refer to the 1996 welfare reforms as 
a revolution, but the difference between $5.6 billion and the $51.7 billion spent shows 
that Congress and a series of presidents from both parties also created a revolution in 
work support programs. 
 
Figure 13
Poverty Rates for Children Living with 
























After Tax and Non-Tax Transfers
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Green Book, 
(2004), Table H-21, based on analysis conducted by the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Congressional Budget Office.
Poverty Rate Based On:
 
 
¶37 And the two revolutions fit together.  The analysis depicted in Figure 13, conducted 
by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Congressional Budget Office, 
provides a clear view of the impact of government programs on poverty rates of children 
in families headed by unmarried mothers in 1990, before welfare reform, and in 1999, 
after welfare reform.  Compare the first bar graph in each set.  These bars show the 
poverty rate before any government tax or transfer programs—life in the state of nature, 
so to speak.65  Here we see that the poverty rate in 1999 was over twenty percentage 
points lower than in 1990 (fifty percent versus thirty-nine percent).  Undoubtedly, this 
                                                 
65 There could be a slight impact of government programs on the poverty estimates before government 
assistance.  For example, mothers who had previously been in government education and training programs 
could have jobs that pay better or the availability of the EITC could increase the likelihood that mothers 
would work or work more hours.  These effects, which are likely to be minor, would have been present 
both in 1990 and 1999. 
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decline in raw poverty before any government assistance was due to increased work and 
earnings by these unmarried mothers as reviewed above.  
¶38 Now consider the impact of government programs, beginning with spending 
programs other than those administered through the tax code.  In 1990, these programs 
had a major impact on poverty, driving the rate down from fifty percent to thirty-seven 
percent, a drop of over twenty-five percent.  But despite the lower raw poverty rate in 
1999, these same spending programs still managed to drive poverty down by nine 
percentage points (from thirty-nine percent to thirty percent), or nearly twenty-five 
percent.  Now consider the child poverty rates after the effects of the EITC are taken into 
account.  In 1990, the EITC had virtually no impact on poverty, both because it was 
much smaller in 1990 than in 1999 and because so few of these mothers worked in 1990.  
But in 1999, the EITC drove child poverty down another five percentage points, or by 
over fifteen percent. 
¶39 It is often said that poverty programs are poor programs, but the story that lies 
behind the data in Figure 13 is a rare and hopeful example of how government programs 
can augment the efforts of individuals to produce an outcome that is high on the nation’s 
agenda of social goals.  The combination of more work by disadvantaged mothers and the 
growth of government programs that reinforced their efforts while increasing their 
income was associated with a poverty rate that was nearly a third lower than it had been 
before welfare reform. 
¶40 Stepping back to reflect on these trends, three lessons for social policy seem 
apparent.  The first, and most important, is that carrots and sticks work.  Social policy 
should emphasize—and where necessary and possible demand—responsible personal 
behavior and then reward that behavior.  Second, one of the major arguments against 
welfare reform was that there were not enough jobs available in the American economy 
to support a major movement of mothers into the job market.66  That concern was 
misplaced as something on the order of 1.5 million additional mothers found jobs.  Third, 
the prediction that low-wage jobs would doom mothers and their children to a life of 
poverty turned out to be questionable.  There is no doubt that a full-time job, even at 
minimum wage, when combined with income from the EITC, provides more income than 
welfare alone, even in states like Connecticut and California with the highest welfare 
benefits.67  But we know from numerous surveys that mothers leaving welfare on average 
earned about eight or nine dollars an hour, well above the minimum wage.68  Moreover, 
nearly all the mothers who went to work got the EITC and many also received up to 
$1000 or even $1500 in food stamps.  Both on paper and in practice (Figure 10), most 
mothers who left welfare improved their financial condition.69 
                                                 
66 For an overview of the arguments used by scholars, politicians, and editorial page writers against welfare 
reform, see HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27. 
67 See generally NORMA B. COE, GREGORY ACS, ROBERT I. LERMAN & KEITH WATSON, THE URBAN INST., 
DOES WORK PAY? A SUMMARY OF WORK INCENTIVES UNDER TANF (1998), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf28.pdf (providing an overview of state welfare programs). 
68 See, e.g., GREGORY ACS & PAMELA J. LOPREST, THE URBAN INST., TANF CASELOAD COMPOSITION AND 
LEAVERS SYNTHESIS REPORT 29–30 (2007). 
69 See Bollinger et. al, supra note 59; Robert A. Moffitt, The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on AFDC 
Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and Labor Force Behavior, in ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND 
WELFARE REFORM, 91, 91–118 (Sheldon Danzinger ed., 1999); Schoeni & Blank, supra note 59, at 8. 
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IV. THERE IS A LOT LEFT TO DO 
¶41 A problem with policymaking in the nation’s capital and many state capitals is the 
highly partisan nature of the debate on welfare reform.  In the battle to reauthorize the 
national reform law between 2002 and 2005, for example, the debate focused primarily 
on how high the welfare work requirements should be and as a result took a partisan turn 
almost immediately.  This fight over work requirements seemed to preempt the kind of 
reasoned debate that would have been desirable.  Four additional items should have been 
high on the agenda, but either were not discussed at all or received too little (and too 
partisan) discussion: maintaining or expanding the work support system; reducing 
nonmarital births and increasing marriage rates; providing more help to floundering or 
disconnected mothers; and addressing the problem of male non-work, crime, and 
incarceration.  All of these issues should attract careful attention from policymakers and 
result in a new burst of innovation that would increase the personal responsibility of low-
income Americans and further reduce poverty. 
A. Maintaining the Work Support System 
¶42 Many members of Congress do not seem to be fully aware of the vital role played 
by the work support system in providing incentives for unskilled and inexperienced 
adults to enter the workforce and take low-wage jobs, in reducing the poverty rate, and 
even in fighting the growing inequality in America.70  The work support system is a 
national treasure and should be well tended by both federal and state policymakers.  More 
specifically, two important actions now seem appropriate. 
¶43 The first stems from the fact that not all eligible working families receive all the 
work support benefits for which they qualify.71  As we have seen, a good example of 
actions Congress can take to improve effectiveness of the work support system is the 
2002 food stamp reforms that streamlined state administration and led to increased food 
stamp enrolment by working families.72  These reforms are an especially good model 
because they were proposed by states, based on the experience state officials had in 
trying to administer food stamps for working families, and were adopted by Congress and 
the Bush Administration on a bipartisan basis.  As this example suggests, Congress 
should periodically review all programs in the work support system to ensure that eligible 
families are actually receiving the benefits, and solicit advice from recipients, state 
administrators, and researchers on improving the programs. 
¶44 Second, low-income working families need more help paying for child care.  
Although Congress greatly increased child care funds when welfare reform was enacted 
in 1996, there have only been a few modest increases since then.  There are many low-
income working families that do not receive help paying for child care and there are large 
                                                 
70 ISAACS, SAWHILL & HASKINS, supra note 14, at 85. 
71 See generally ROBERT P. STOKER & LAURA A. WILSON, WHEN WORK IS NOT ENOUGH: STATE AND 
FEDERAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT NEEDY WORKERS (2006) (examining the work support systems in all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia and criticizing the current work support system because many eligible 
workers do not receive these benefits); SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI & SETH ZIMMERMAN, THE URBAN INST., 
TRENDS IN WORK SUPPORTS FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN, (2007), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311495_Work_Supports.pdf (compiling information about and 
criticizing what percentage of eligible workers receive the benefits for which they are qualified under child-
care subsidies, EITC, food stamps, Medicaid, and SCHIP). 
72 See RATCLIFFE, MCKERNAN & FINEGOLD, supra note 50, at 1. 
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inequities in the system because mothers leaving welfare are more likely to get a child 
care subsidy than similar mothers who did not go on welfare.  Other than this 
conspicuous inequity, the child care block grant and the vouchers it funds seem to be 
working well.  The major problem is simply that states need more money to ensure that 
more working families receive child care.  Mark Greenberg of the Center for American 
Progress has recently recommended increasing child care funding by twenty billion 
dollars a year.73  Given the serious and growing problems with the federal deficit, twenty 
billion dollars is too much to expect, but Congress should try to increase child care 
funding by one or two billion dollars per year over two or three years and make sure that 
states use all the money for child care.74  The recommendation of one or two billion 
dollars is inherently subjective, but the amount should be small enough that it has a good 
chance of being accepted by Congress but big enough to provide meaningful help to low-
income families trying to work. 
B. Reducing Non-Marital Birth Rates and Increasing Marriage Rates 
¶45 Evidence shows that the optimum family form for promoting child development is 
the married-couple family.75  Unfortunately, the share of children—especially black 
children—living with two parents has declined precipitously over the past four decades.76 
It is regrettable that scholars and program innovators have produced so little information 
about how to restore marriage rates.  The knowledge base for increasing marriage rates 
today is approximately equivalent to the knowledge base for reducing poverty when 
President Johnson initiated the War on Poverty in 1964.  To expand this knowledge base 
and then expand on what seems to work, several propositions seem reasonable. 
¶46 First, we should do more to reduce non-marital births.  Along with the decline of 
marriage, the entry of women into the paid labor-force, and the aging of the population, 
the rise of non-marital births is one of the most important demographic events of our 
time.77  For reasons that are not clear, in sharp contrast with the modest concern over 
non-marital births among older women and declining marriage rates, the scholarly and 
policy worlds have long tried to figure out why so many teens give birth outside of 
marriage and how to do something about it.  The consequences of teen births are serious 
for both the teen mother and for her baby.78  Not the least of these consequences is that 
having a baby outside marriage reduces the mother’s chances of eventually marrying. 
                                                 
73 Mark Greenberg, Next Steps for Federal Child Care Policy, THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2007, at 73, 87, 
available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2826/information_show.htm?doc_id=522089. 
74 There is an inherent tension between using a fixed sum of money for child care to help the maximum 
number of poor families trying to work and ensuring that child care is of high quality.  Two important 
aspects of high quality child care are high teacher-to-student ratios and well qualified teachers, both of 
which are expensive.  But anything that is expensive reduces the number of families that can be served.  
The federal block grant leaves the decision about how much to emphasize quality and how much to 
emphasize coverage to the states.  See Ron Haskins, Child Development and Child Care Policy: Modest 
Impacts, in DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 140, 140–70 (David B. Pillemer & 
Sheldon H. White eds., 2005). 
75 See, e.g. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, 
WHAT HELPS 3 (1994); McLanahan, Donahue & Haskins, supra note 10, at 3–12 (claiming most people 
today would probably agree that a “good” or “healthy” marriage is the ideal setting for raising children). 
76 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5. 
77 CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, 124–34 (1984). 
78 See e.g., ELIZABETH TERRY-HUMEN, JENNIFER MANLOVE & KRISTIN A. MOORE, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO 
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¶47 There is evidence that several types of programs that engage teens in constructive 
activities and provide authoritative advice about abstinence and birth control can reduce 
both pregnancy rates and non-marital births without increasing abortion rates.  These 
programs are reviewed in great detail by Douglas Kirby for the National Campaign to 
Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy.79  The programs that have proven most effective 
in reducing both pregnancy rates and sexually transmitted diseases among teens are based 
on tested curriculums that emphasize, among other factors: 
 Focusing on specific goals that influence behaviors that help 
achieve these goals (especially increasing abstinence and use of 
condoms); 
 Changing factors that affect sexual behavior, such as knowledge of 
perceived risks, attitudes, perceived norms about abstinence, and 
goals for the future;  
 Involving youth in constructive activities with adults such as 
mentoring and community service; and 
 Securing support from local authorities such as schools, 
departments of health, and community-based organizations. 
¶48 Congress should provide the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
with up to one billion dollars a year for five years to provide money to states, local school 
districts, and other community-based organizations to implement tested programs shown 
to reduce sexual activity and teen pregnancy rates.  All funded programs should 
emphasize either abstinence, or abstinence and condom use, and must agree to collect a 
standard set of data to monitor outcomes.  HHS should give priority to jurisdictions that 
have high poverty rates.  In addition, HHS should select several exemplary programs for 
careful evaluation by third parties using random-assignment designs.  These third parties 
should then periodically report their findings to Congress and to the public.  
¶49 Second, both the federal and state governments should experiment with ways to 
increase marriage rates among couples who want to marry, especially low-income 
couples.  If the goals of the TANF program can be accepted as statements of national 
policy, increasing marriage rates and the share of children in married-couple families is 
already an official goal of federal policy.80  Critics often pose this goal as one of trying to 
talk people into getting married.  But research conducted on representative samples of 
couples who have had a child outside of marriage—a group that is disproportionately 
                                                                                                                                                 
PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, PLAYING CATCH UP: HOW CHILDREN BORN TO TEEN MOTHERS FARE 3 (2005) 
(children born to teen mothers begin kindergarten with lower levels of school readiness).  But see generally 
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, DESTINIES OF THE DISADVANTAGED: THE POLITICS OF TEEN CHILDBEARING 
(2007) (summarizing results from the Baltimore Study of teens who gave birth in the mid-1960s and were 
followed for nearly four decades by Furstenberg and his colleagues; presenting a strong and controversial 
critique of many of the public policies that the nation has adopted to fight teen pregnancy). 
79 See DOUGLAS KIRBY, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, EMERGING 
ANSWERS 2007: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEEN PREGNANCY AND SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES (2007). 
80 See SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS, supra note 36, at 14 (noting that two of the four goals of TANF 
contain explicit statements about marriage.  Goal 2 is to “end the dependence of needy parents on 
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage” and Goal 4 is to “encourage the 
formation and maintenance of two-parent families”). 
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poor and minority—shows that half of them live together, a total of eighty percent say 
they are in love, and ninety percent of those who live together say their chances of 
marriage are “fifty-fifty or better.”81  If couples say they want to marry, why not fund 
community-based agencies to help them move toward marriage and to acquire 
relationship skills that research shows can increase marital satisfaction and reduce 
divorce rates?82 
¶50 Two actions that have already been taken to promote healthy marriage deserve 
public recognition.  The first is that the Bush administration used discretionary funds to 
establish high-quality demonstration programs designed to build and strengthen 
marriage.83  Some of the programs are designed for young unmarried couples who have 
had a child together (and often cohabit),84 some for young couples who are already 
married,85 and some to promote community-wide programs that use media to point out 
the advantages of marriage for children, adults, and communities.  Other programs are 
designed to use churches and other non-profit organizations to promote and strengthen 
marriage.86 
¶51 Marriage education under the Bush programs is typically conducted in a setting 
with four or five couples and involves instruction and discussion of topics shown by 
research to be key issues in most marriages, such as communication, money 
management, dispute settlement, child rearing, trust, family violence, and sexual 
fidelity.87  The sessions often follow clearly specified lessons and activities from 
curriculums developed for young couples, including curriculums that have been 
developed specifically for low-income black and Hispanic couples.88  There are now a 
host of random-assignment studies being conducted around the nation to determine 
whether using this kind of program can increase marriage rates or reduce divorce rates.89  
All the studies are also collecting information on child outcomes, including performance 
on standardized tests and school performance to determine whether children benefit if 
their parents participate in marriage education programs.  The federal government should 
continue these demonstration programs for at least another five years to determine 
whether carefully implemented marriage education that includes family coordinators and 
services impacts marriage rates, divorce rates, and children’s development. 
                                                 
81 Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Reproduction of Poverty, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
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82 Howard J. Markman, Mari Jo Renick, Frank J. Floyd, Scott M. Stanley and Mari Clements, Preventing 
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84 M. Robin Dion, Healthy Marriage Programs: Learning What Works, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2005, at 
139, 147, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/08_FOC15-2_fall05_Dion.pdf. 
85 MDRC, Supporting Healthy Marriage, http://www.mdrc.org/project_12_64.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2009). 
86 See generally MIKE MCMANUS & HARRIET MCMANUS, LIVING TOGETHER: MYTHS, RISKS, AND 
ANSWERS (2008) (drawing a grim picture of cohabitation and divorce, and recommending the 
implementation of a program by churches throughout the country where older couples mentor young 
couples about how to build a trusting, happy, and enduring marriage). 
87 Ron Haskins, Moynihan Was Right: Now What? 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI 282, 302 
(2009) [hereinafter Haskins, Moynihan Was Right]. 
88 THEODORA OOMS, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY, ADAPTING HEALTHY MARRIAGE PROGRAMS FOR 
DISADVANTAGED AND CULTURALLY DIVERSE POPULATIONS: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES? 1, 3–5 (2007). 
89 McLanahan, Donahue & Haskins, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
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¶52 Second, the Bush administration also sponsored legislation that now provides $100 
million a year for 5 years to support about 150 programs throughout the nation that aim to 
support healthy marriage.90  Most of the programs are sponsored by community-based 
organizations like churches and other groups that provide services to poor and low-
income families.91  At the moment, none of these programs are being evaluated by well-
designed studies.  Someone with political sensibilities might notice that these programs 
are creating a network of local organizations and individual advocates who could play a 
role when the question of reauthorizing the $100 million program comes up in Congress 
in 2009 or 2010. 
¶53 Yet another way to increase the incentives for marriage is to reduce financial 
penalties in both the tax code and in transfer programs for couples who marry.  Congress 
has already taken several actions to reduce tax penalties for married couples and has even 
modified the EITC so that married couples get to keep more of their EITC as their 
earnings rise.92  Careful research on a representative national sample by Gregory Acs and 
Elaine Maag of the Urban Institute shows that for most cohabiting couples under 200% of 
the poverty level, the major marriage penalties come from loss of benefits in transfer 
programs rather than the EITC.93  Based on this research, the federal or state governments 
should authorize demonstrations that study the effects of allowing low-income couples 
who marry to retain their welfare benefits, especially TANF and food stamps, for a year 
or two after marriage. 
¶54 Finally, a less specific consideration than the proposals outlined above invokes a 
message about American culture.  Consider welfare reform.  It is true that a large number 
of federal and state statutory provisions were changed to produce both the sticks 
represented by work requirements and time limits, and the carrots represented by child 
care, health insurance, and wage subsidies for those who work.  Many of these reforms 
were supported by scientific demonstrations showing that they would increase work and 
even save government money.94  But having visited many of the programs, both before 
and after welfare reform, and having discussed the reforms with welfare recipients, 
welfare administrators, politicians from both sides of the aisle at the federal and state 
level, and with many scholars who study poverty and welfare, I would make the 
subjective claim that during the 1990s something very near to a consensus was developed 
on the need to increase personal responsibility and reduce welfare dependency among the 
poor.  When public figures—and in this regard President Clinton deserves great credit—
                                                 
90 See Admin. for Child. & Families, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., The Healthy Marriage 
Initiative, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/mission.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2009). 
91 NAT’L HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CTR., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., ADMINISTRATION 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE, 2002-2008: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 6–
11 (2008), available at http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/docs/acf_guide.pdf. 
92 Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing Many Households with 
Children, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2005, at 157, 157, available at 
http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/09_FOC_15-2_fall05_Carasso-Steuerle.pdf. 
93 See GREGORY ACS & ELAINE MAAG, THE URBAN INST., IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN MARRIAGE PROMOTION INITIATIVES FOR COHABITING COUPLES WITH CHILDREN AND MARRIAGE 
PENALTIES IN TAX AND TRANSFER PROGRAMS 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311162_B-66.pdf. 
94 See generally DAN BLOOM & CHARLES MICHALOPOULOS, NEXT GENERATION PROJECT, HOW WELFARE 
AND WORK POLICIES AFFECT EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME: A SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH (2001), available at 
http://www.mdrc.org/publications/99/full.pdf (examining strategies to help mothers who have left welfare 
for work find stable jobs and advance to better jobs). 
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are singing a common tune of personal responsibility and work, and when this music is 
consistent with sharp changes in programs throughout the nation that are willingly and 
skillfully implemented by agents of government, something that might be called cultural 
change is afoot.  The welfare reform movement changed the way many politicians, 
welfare administrators, and welfare recipients themselves viewed both welfare and work.  
Without similar broad changes in society reflecting the importance of education and 
marriage to adults, children, and society, our progress against poverty will be limited and 
the development of children—especially minority children—will suffer. 
C. Floundering Mothers 
¶55 One of the most difficult problems in formulating a welfare system is striking the 
appropriate balance between requirements and risk.  It has been realized almost since 
western societies began providing welfare benefits to the destitute that the availability of 
welfare reduces work effort.95  A review of empirical research as early as 1981 by 
Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick found that welfare did reduce 
work effort.96  The 1996 welfare law addressed the problem of welfare interfering with 
work effort by subjecting welfare mothers to more risk than any previous legislation.  
Specifically, by imposing sanctions on mothers who did not meet work requirements and 
by stipulating a five-year time limit on benefit receipt, the legislation virtually guaranteed 
that some mothers would lose their benefits.  If mothers did not have cash from welfare 
and yet found it difficult to work consistently, they and their children would face 
destitution.  
¶56 Rebecca Blank has examined the record on destitution associated with the 1996 
reforms, perhaps more carefully than anyone else.97  Blank estimates that more than two 
million single mothers have difficulty finding jobs or holding them and do not receive 
cash welfare.98  Most of these mothers face multiple barriers to work including mild 
disabilities, addictions, transportation problems, personality problems, or have more than 
two children.99  Blank proposes a special program for these mothers that would allow 
them to continue drawing cash welfare as long as they are attempting to prepare for 
employment or are working toward removing one or more of their barriers to work.100  
The program would be conducted by skilled caseworkers with small caseloads who 
would be able to provide individualized counseling and would have access to a range of 
services.101  It would make sense for the federal government to set aside perhaps one 
billion dollars per year for the next five or six years to allow states to experiment with 
                                                 
95See SEYMOUR DRESCHER, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT ON SOCIAL REFORM 143 (1968) (Tocqueville 
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Mothers Who Face Serious Barriers to Work, FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2007, at 183, available at 
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demonstration programs along the lines recommended by Blank.  The federal government 
should pay the full cost of random-assignment evaluations of these programs.  Although 
federal and state policymakers have not paid adequate attention to this difficult problem, 
it is potentially a politically divisive issue that could be used by opponents of welfare 
reform to argue that the law is leading to too much suffering and should be fundamentally 
revised.  Social problems that are ignored fester and can ultimately lead to overreaction. 
D. Single Males and Fathers 
¶57 Another problem that, if anything, was exacerbated by welfare reform, is that too 
many young black males are dropping out of the labor force, fathering children outside 
marriage that they do not support, and adopting a life of crime and incarceration.  In 
1965, the work rates of young black males was about seventy-five percent greater than 
the work rate of young black females.102  But over the years the work rates of black males 
fell while those of black females rose.103  By 2000, the work rates of black females 
surpassed the work rates of black males.104  When welfare reform required mothers to 
work, their work rates increased dramatically while the work rates of young black males 
were stable or declining.  That mothers had little trouble finding jobs suggests that job 
availability does not explain the poor work rates of black males. 
¶58 Not surprisingly, increased levels of unemployment by young males are associated 
with rising crime rates.  Census and survey data of prison populations indicate that of 
males born between 1965 and 1969, three percent of whites and twenty percent of blacks 
had been in prison by the time they reached their early thirties.105  This rate of 
incarceration for blacks was nearly double the rate for blacks born in the late 1940s and 
nearly seven times the rate for whites in the same age group.106  More amazing still, sixty 
percent of black high school dropouts born in the 1960s spent time in prison.107 
¶59 These spectacular trends reflect at least two underlying sets of causes.  The first is 
the unfair and unwise set of laws and institutions that are the immediate cause of high 
incarceration rates.  Mandatory sentences—especially for dealing drugs—have 
contributed greatly to the massive buildup of black males in prison.108  A notable feature 
of the federal drug law passed in 1986 (in response to the crack epidemic) is that it 
imposed especially tough sentences on the sale of crack cocaine.109  First-time offenders 
were to receive a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for selling just five grams 
of crack and selling more resulted in longer mandatory minimum sentences.110  As a 
result, many black males—who were disproportionately likely to sell crack (as opposed 
                                                 
102 Author’s calculations based on Current Population Survey data (thanks to Emily Roessel for 
professional assistance).  See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, http://www.census.gov/cps/ 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
103 Id. 
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Vol. 4:1] Ron Haskins 
 
59 
to powdered) cocaine—spent the critical years when they should have been in the job 
market locked up in prison. 
¶60 The second cause of high black incarceration rates is the high level of criminal 
behavior by young blacks.  Based on incarceration rates, it is clear that on a per-capita 
basis blacks commit significantly more crimes than whites.111  For example, the 2005 
homicide rate of 3.5 homicides per 100,000 whites as compared with 26.5 for blacks 
gives an idea of the dramatic difference in crime rates between the two groups.112 
¶61 As Orlando Patterson, a black sociologist at Harvard, wrote, the propensity of black 
youths to commit crimes is due, in part, to the “catastrophic state of black family life.”113  
Undoubtedly other factors, including discrimination, limited economic opportunities, and 
problems in gender relations, are involved, but the lack of male influence in the home 
contributes to all of these factors as well as directly to crime rates.  In place of a strong 
home life featuring limits enforced by fathers, Patterson holds that young black men have 
created what he calls the “cool pose culture.”114  This culture functions “almost like a 
drug,” compelling young black men to hang out on the street, dress sharply, make sexual 
conquests, use drugs, and listen to hip-hop music with lyrics glorifying violence, 
misogyny, drugs, and sex.115  How to break the hold of this culture, which Patterson 
believes has about one-fifth of young black males in its grip, is one of the top issues for 
both the black community and for policymakers at all levels of government.116 
¶62 Three actions should be taken to address the extreme level of incarceration among 
young black men.  First, marriage should be promoted and extra-marital pregnancy 
discouraged.  There is now widespread agreement that being reared in female-headed 
families is a major cause of criminal behavior by young blacks.117  Thus, the policies 
proposed above to reduce extra-marital births and promote marriage, if successful, would 
almost certainly reduce the number of young men who commit crimes. 
¶63 Second, more should be learned about, and greater investments made, in prison 
release programs.  Given that well over 600,000 people are released from prison each 
year, interest in helping men readjust to life outside prison has been increasing for several 
years.118  Typical is a large-scale, random-assignment study of a well-known program 
conducted by the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) in New York City.  CEO 
is one of the most experienced organizations in the nation at helping ex-felons find 
employment.119  The current study is following about 1000 people who either received or 
did not receive the CEO job-assistance program.  Early results suggest that men who join 
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programs aimed at assisting felons soon after they are released were “less likely to have 
their parole revoked, to be convicted of a felony, and to be re-incarcerated.”120  States and 
the federal Department of Justice should ensure that these programs continue to grow and 
that new programs conform to the results of the numerous on-going evaluations. 
¶64 The final action, and the most difficult for policymakers, will be to revise laws that 
impose mandatory sentences on non-violent, first-time offenders.  The law enforcement 
system should concentrate on keeping young men who have committed nonviolent 
crimes out of prison.  The first step is to repeal laws that provide for harsh mandatory 
sentences on those who sell crack cocaine and laws that provide harsher penalties for 
selling crack than for selling powered cocaine.  In addition, the discretion of judges in 
imposing prison sentences should be restored.  The Supreme Court, not exactly a bastion 
of liberal thought in America, has recently taken significant steps in this direction.  On 
December 10, 2007, the Supreme Court issued two 7–2 decisions (Gall v. United 
States121 and Kimbrough v. United States122) that provide some relief from the harsh 
federal sentencing guidelines enacted in 1986.123  Both of these cases are consistent with 
increasingly urgent recommendations made for several years by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission calling for reductions in penalties for the sale of crack cocaine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶65 A host of demographic and economic trends in the United States make it difficult 
for the nation to make progress against poverty and income inequality.  However, 
government policies that raise work levels and provide public benefits to supplement 
earnings have proven to be effective in fighting poverty among female-headed families.  
But further progress seems unlikely unless more poor adults work, reduce the number of 
children born outside of marriage, and marry at higher rates.  Government should spend 
additional funds to strengthen programs that provide cash and other benefits to low-wage 
workers and expand cash subsidies for young male workers.  It should also design and 
test new programs for single mothers who encounter difficulty getting or holding a job, 
encourage marriage, and test innovative programs that discourage extra-marital births, 
especially among teens. 
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